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Abstract
The development of an appropriate regime for trade, investment and the movement of creative and
professional workers in the cultural industries will be among the issues for negotiation at the WTO in
2002 and beyond. One proposal calls for a New Instrument on Cultural Diversity (NICD), an
international agreement outside the WTO. Cultural diversity at the international level is akin to a
domestic policy of multiculturalism adopted by some countries. We examine the rationale and
enforcement of multicultural policies within Canada, a country that historically has been committed
to biculturalism, English and French, and to the concerns of aboriginal cultures. The Canadian
multicultural budget is insignificant in comparison to government expenditure encouraging better
communication and understanding among the two established cultures and multiculturalism has had
almost no effect on the complex of regulatory, tax, and subsidy policies supporting the Canadian
cultural industries. The Canadian case illustrates that a modern democracy is unlikely to support
multicultural policies that do more than recognize and integrate immigrant cultures into the polity.
An international trade agreement cannot impose by force the cultural preferences of a
majority, as a country can opt out of the agreement. There is more diversity, both of a good and bad
type depending on the perspective, among those countries opting in than would occur if a global
democratic state existed. A cultural industry agreement negotiated under the WTO would permit
more degrees of bargaining freedom in accommodating different cultural interests among members
and be enforceable on members. The NICD, in contrast, consists of gratuitous promises and fails to
address the problems at issue. Proponents of the NICD believe that policies of its member countries
could not be challenged under international law. Since the United States would surely retaliate to
restrictions imposed on it, either the NICD’s interpretation of international law is incorrect or
international law has the same status as the Ten Commandments and far less moral authority.
1Introduction
The international economic system operates in the framework of three principal regimes--
the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank--each with a distinct responsibility. These
standalone regimes have expanded their reach and undertaken more complex
responsibilities over the past five decades. The continuing functional and institutional
separation among them is a reminder that international governance systems do not offer
the same opportunities (some might say the temptation) for launching complex policies as
a nation state. There is no world government with the legitimacy and authority to
integrate the policies of international agencies to better pursue a mix of goals.
International cooperation within an agency results from difficult negotiations among
countries. The resulting agreements must be self-enforcing, given the absence of a
sufficiently developed international law.
We are concerned with the agreements and institutions governing trade and trade-related
activities. From a modest beginning as the outcome of a stillborn International Trade
Organization, the GATT provided the framework for significant reductions in tariffs and
other barriers to international trade. Over time, it developed a workable system of
adjudicating disputes and a process of consolidation and renewal through successive
rounds of negotiation. The last of these extended its responsibilities to include services
and trade-related copyright and investment issues. Its institutional structure was
revamped to accommodate this wider domain of responsibilities and renamed the World
Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO is more like a club than a state. It cannot coerce a
country to join nor stop a member from leaving. Its authority derives solely from the
gains that its system of constraints generates for its members. Individual members or
coalitions of members must do better within than without or they will decamp.1
In 2002, the WTO is preparing for a new round of international trade and investment
negotiations. The rules governing trade, investment, and movement of creative and
professional workers of the cultural industries2 are one of the issues that will be on the
negotiating table. The mix of economic characteristics in these activities and the
important influence that cultural consumption and participation in creative processes have
on the development of individuals and cultures make designing an appropriate regime for
these activities a significant challenge.
There are a number of sectors considered to have a sufficiently unique set of
characteristics to warrant special arrangements in international trade agreements.
Designing rules that take into account the economic characteristics of the cultural
industries presents no more of a challenge than that which was overcome for the financial
and telecommunications sectors under GATS or for the copyright industries under
TRIPS. What is more difficult to assess is the implication for international governance of
                                                
1 There is, of course, a potential for gaming among members about how the overall gains may be shared
within these constraints.
2 The cultural industries produce and distribute television and radio programming, broadcast signals, films,
books, magazines, and recorded music.
2a vaguely understood link between the consumption and production of cultural goods and
services and national cultures.
One of the responses to this aspect of the problem is a call for a New Instrument on
Cultural Diversity (NICD). Part of the discourse concerning a NICD addresses the overall
impact of globalization and has the following flavour:
Even though cultural considerations per se were not centre stage at the
events in Seattle (in contrast to the final months of the negotiation of the
Uruguay Round in 1993 and the negotiation of MIA in 1998), much of the
anti-globalization discourse was still fuelled for many observers by the
pace and extent of the changes imposed on society by globalization and
the consequent feeling that cultural references are being lost. Far from
dying down after Seattle, this discourse has only increased in intensity.
Which gives to think, as suggested by Faouzia Zouari, that "[translation]
the precedence that economic imperatives take over social and political
values, backed by the prodigious expansion of the information highway, is
challenging national identities, sometimes driving them into retreat and
even into aggressively asserting counter-models." (Ivan Bernier, “A New
International Instrument on Cultural Diversity: Questions and Answers”
presented at the second annual conference of the INCD, Lucerne,
Switzerland, May 21-23, 2001)
This concern with commercialism, modernity and rapid change is the subject of
extensive email campaigns and web postings, none of which would be currently
possible without all three of these elements. Addressing the expressed concerns
requires not only changing all parts of the international system but the policies
and organizational modes of many countries. In this paper, we examine a more
narrowly focused proposal, an instrument that would apply only to the cultural
industries. In this more limited setting, a special instrument, it is claimed, would
promote a permanent legal foundation for cultural diversity. Proponents describe
the proposed regime as encouraging cultural production within nations and
authentic exchange among them while promoting the dynamic coexistence of a
diversity of cultures.
The Canadian government has been a significant promoter of this idea. The roots
of this support lie in a frustration at the ineffectiveness of an earlier strategy of
exempting the cultural industries from trade agreements. As events transpired, the
cultural industries were not immune from action under trade agreements but more
importantly, the exemption put policy conflicts, almost all of which were with the
United States, out of the rules-based diplomatic boxing ring and into a bilateral
back alley. A government sponsored committee of advisers on the cultural
industries recommended a special instrument governing sectoral trade but was
agnostic about whether it should be inside the WTO or a standalone agreement.3
                                                
3 Canada, Report of the Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade (February,
1999). Canadian Culture in a Global World, New Strategies for Culture and Trade.
3The government responded to the committee’s recommendation on a special
instrument by stating that “the purpose of the agreement would be to set out clear
ground rules to enable Canada and other countries to maintain policies that
promote their culture while respecting the rules of the international trading system
and ensuring markets for cultural exports. One department, Foreign Affairs and
International Trade, supported the negotiation of a special agreement within the
GATS4 while another, Canadian Heritage, actively promoted a standalone
arrangement. Canadian Heritage acted as a catalyst in forming the International
Network on Cultural Policy (INCP)5 linking the cultural ministers of a set of
countries, hosting its first meeting in 1998, and in subsequently promoting and
nurturing a supporting umbrella organization of cultural interest groups, the
International Network for Cultural Diversity (INCD),6 to develop enthusiasm
from non-governmental sources for what has become known as the new
international instrument for cultural diversity (NICD).
Section 1 of the Draft Convention on Cultural Diversity,7 commissioned by the INCD,
lists the following as the purposes of the NICD:
(a) establish a multilateral framework of principles, rules and disciplines for the
purposes of preserving and enhancing cultural diversity both within and
among nations;
(b) maintain and strengthen the capacity of sovereign states to preserve and
enhance cultural diversity by taking any action, or adopting, maintaining and
enforcing any measure that they consider necessary to preserve or enhance
cultural diversity;
(c) secure the rights of individual artists and creators to freedom of expression
and to work in security and free from censorship.
                                                
4 At the time of the Doha Ministerial meeting in 2001, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade issued an information paper on culture and trade that stated: “Canada is keeping all options open
on the most appropriate forum for the negotiation of a new international instrument and its content.
Pending the development (of) an NIICD, Canada will continue to seek the maximum flexibility in
international agreements to pursue its cultural policy objectives.”
5 As of March, 2001, there were 46 member countries of the INCP. Its purpose is “to strengthen cultural
policies to enable governments, together with civil society, to create an environment that values
diversity, creativity, accessibility and freedom.” See http://64.26.177.19/index_e.shtml .
6 The INCD is an NGO comprised of a world-wide (52 countries) network of artists and cultural groups. It
is registered as an NGO with the WTO. Its coordinator, who attended the Fourth Session of the
Ministerial Conference, reported his view of the proceedings to the membership: “The Doha meetings
were six days of tense negotiations. Because they had prevented a new round from being launched in
Seattle, delegates from the South, the developing nations and least developed countries, were bullied
and pressured in Doha to make concessions and agree to a new round.”
7 As of May 1, 2002, a copy of the Draft Convention was available at
http://www.incd.net/html/english/res/ccd%20draft.doc.
4The first two of these subsections propose to establish an international framework
allowing member countries a free hand in developing national cultural policy. Subsection
c) runs counter in spirit to a) and b) in requiring a member country to grant artists and
creators freedom of speech and expression and its inclusion thins down the list of
qualifying countries. According to the annual survey of freedom of the press by Freedom
House, only 72 out of the 187 countries covered had a free press at the end of 2000.
Ironically, only 27 of the 46 countries included in the INCP, the political grouping, are
judged to have a free press; 10 others are rated as having a partly free press and 9 as “not
free.”8 Freedom House’s measure covers a number of dimensions of press freedom. As
no country receives a perfect score, no state would qualify under a strict interpretation of
the condition.9 Subsection c) of the draft refers to individual artists and creators but is
presumably not restricted to them.10
Our analysis builds on the similarity between multicultural initiatives within a state and
the NICD within the international community. The supporting campaigns and debates use
the same vocabulary11 and propose similar rules. We begin our analysis by exploring how
multiculturalism policies seek to modify the working constitutions12 in modern
democracies. To delineate the potential impact of multicultural policy on a working
constitution of a modern democracy we examine the differing views on political structure
of representative schools of liberal and multicultural thought. We locate empirically the
extent that embracing multicultural policy might change the working constitution and
overall policy portfolio of a modern democracy by applying a two-stage process. We first
identify conditions that would most likely support adopting multiculturalism in a modern
democracy. Then we identify a country that approximates those conditions and has
                                                
8 In its “About us” description on its web site, the INCP states that its members “support local and national
cultures in an increasingly globalized world where access to information is essential.” Two of its
members are China and Cuba. These countries have performed remarkably well in a number of areas
but freedom of the press and tolerance of dissenting groups are not among them.
9 Canada, which scores very highly and is in the group classified as having a free press, had the following
negatives noted in the summary account accompanying its score. “A Nova Scotia supreme court in
March 2000 barred the Canadian Press from printing articles about an official report on a boat collision
that killed a fisherman. In November, the superior court in Toronto ruled against eight media outlets
that challenged the police seizure of news film of an anti-poverty protest at the Ontario legislature.
Media concentration has become a more urgent issue recently, as a media group sought to acquire ten
French dailies in Quebec. In a February study, 45 percent of journalists reported that they censored
themselves “occasionally or often” due to fear of reprisals from media owners. Photographers were
doused with pepper spray by police while covering a protest against the OAS. Two Canadian Sikh
journalists were intimidated after reporting on misconduct by Sikh temple committees. Three
journalists were detained in Montreal in May while covering a demonstration and charged with
“disturbing the public order.” Charges were later dropped. A journalist with Le Journal in Montreal
was shot in September after threats related to his crime reporting.
10 The use of the fatwah in some Muslim countries obviously affects the freedom of expression of artists
and creators. The most widely reported example was the Ayotollah’s fatwah, which offered a $2.5
million reward for killing Salmon Rushdie for blaspheming the Muslim religion.
11 Some of the key words are diversity, cultural pluralism, and tolerance.
12 The term “working constitution” incorporates the written constitution as interpreted by the courts, the
political institutions of the country and political norms.
5embraced multicultural policy domestically. Canada meets the conditions and advertises
itself as the first country to adopt multicultural policy. The extent of the impact on its
working constitution and cultural policy of adopting multiculturalism serves as our
estimate of the upper limit of multiculturalism’s impact in a modern democracy. We use
this information to inform what might happen if multicultural goals are inserted into the
negotiation of a stand-alone international trade regime for the cultural industries among a
set of countries that vary in organization from democracies to theocracies and in size
from St. Lucia to China.
Working constitutions in modern democracies
Liberal roots
Many countries had already adopted or were adopting democratic government structures
in the post Second World War period. The principles of equality before the law, non-
discriminatory access to government services, freedom of speech and association, and
constitutional uniformity were a major inspiration of the written or unwritten
constitutions of these countries. These liberal values appear in the declarations of intent
in written constitutions and are often given special protection in separate declarations of
rights. By embedding these values in images of citizenship, liberals hoped to encourage
the further development of norms supporting non-discriminatory laws and reducing the
reintroduction of discriminatory access to government services by artful administration.
The adjective liberal has been attached to diverse political agendas. Two important issues
concerning the individual’s relation to the state divide liberals: the raising and education
of children and income distribution policies. We collapse the rich spectrum of differences
of opinion on these issues into two stylized liberal camps, libertarians and social
democrats. 13
Libertarians argue that parents are solely responsible for raising and educating children
until they become adults. Social democrats contend that the state has a significant agency
interest in children as future citizens that warrants constraining the decisions of parents.
They approve of, for example, legal sanctions against the abuse of children and the right
of the state to override a decision by parents to deny their children life-saving medical
attention. Social democrats also believe that state’s agency extends to the education of
children. Children should be required by law to attend a school having a state-approved
curriculum until a specified age.14 This schooling may be provided directly by the state or
                                                
13 Our coarse aggregation suffices for our purposes in this paper. Political competition in the democracies
that emerged from the Second World War and those that joined their ranks in the subsequent two
decades encompassed a broad range of liberal parties as well as religious, communist, and neo-fascist
populist parties.
14 John Rawls (1988, 464), for example, advocates a core curriculum including knowledge of constitutional
and civic rights. Children must be taught: “that liberty of conscience exists in their society and that
apostasy is not a legal crime;” to be “fully cooperating members of society” and “self-supporting;” and
encouraged to hold “the political virtues so that they want to honour the fair terms of social
cooperation in their relations with the rest of society.”
6by a non-profit or commercial school certified by the state, chosen by parents and paid
for, at least in part, by the state.15
The second significant area of dispute among liberals is the redistribution of income.
Libertarians judge the state to be less efficient at gathering information about where help
is needed than voluntary institutions and to be more susceptible to corruption. The source
of the rents that spawn corruption is the state’s monopoly power over policy and
enforcement. For freedom to be realized the state must establish a rule of law delimiting
the scope of individual freedom and constraining the state’s exercise of power. With
respect to policy, the state must not pursue rationally derived concepts of “social justice”
as doing so inevitably produces tyranny (Hayek, 1979). Charity redistributes more
effectively than state programmes as it mobilizes dispersed information about need and
inspires innovative mechanisms to mitigate free-rider problems.
In contrast, social democrats believe that markets generate an unfair distribution of
income, fail frequently, and reinforce racism and prejudice by accommodating the biases
of customers, workers, and owners. To counteract these negative effects of capitalism, the
state should actively pursue “social justice” by adopting combinations of policies that
include, inter alia, significant redistribution through the tax system, affirmative action
programs, economic regulation, and progressive labour laws.16 Pursuing regulatory
efficiency and distributive goals stabilizes the polity by making capitalism more efficient
and just.
John Rawls addressed the conditions that sustain a liberal political constitution (a
“reasoned equilibrium”) as part of his examination of the philosophical foundations of
liberalism. Over time his view on the necessary conditions became more constrained and
his views on justice more relativist.17 In 1997, he revisited the concept of “public reason,”
                                                
15 In Chapter V (paragraph 13) of On Liberty John Stuart Mill wrote: “The objections which are urged with
reason against State education, do not apply to the enforcement of education by the State, but to the
State's taking upon itself to direct that education: which is a totally different thing. That the whole or
any large part of the education of the people should be in State hands, I go as far as any one in
deprecating. All that has been said of the importance of individuality of character and diversity in
opinions and modes of conduct, involves, as of the same unspeakable importance, diversity of
education.”
16 We will use terms such as just and progressive contextually reflecting the language of the group under
discussion. Brian Barry describes what we call the democratic socialism view and he calls an
egalitarian liberal position in Culture and Equality (2001) while Hayek’s writings over four decades
remain the most comprehensive statement of a libertarian (a term he did not like) view. Almost all the
authors involved in the debates among multiculturalists and liberals and those within each camp draw
attention to the strategic use of language by their opponents. Neither Barrie nor Hayek is exceptional in
this regard. Chapter 7 of Hayek’s The Fatal Conceit, 1988, for example, is entitled “Our Poisoned
Language.”
17 His “Justice is Fairness” (1958) began a series of articles exploring justice that were integrated in the
Theory of Justice (1971) in which he states his purpose to be the establishment of an epistemological
foundation for justice as fairness. Nine years later, he phrases his primary social task as articulating “a
public conception of justice that all can live with who regard their person and their relation to society
in a certain way” (1980, 306). By 1985 he notes that in order to effectively take into account the
7the preconditions that members of disparate groups, some holding irreconcilable
religious, moral or philosophical views, can agree on as necessary for organizing social
cooperation based on mutual respect. Public reason had evolved to be the foundation of
Rawls’s political conception of justice—a set of values that answer political questions
and is consistent with basic liberal freedoms (1997, 574 and 585)18. Depending on the
configuration of religious, moral and philosophical views in a country, there may be a
large family of liberal conceptions of political justice and derivative constitutional
arrangements or there may be none. Rawls offers examples to illustrate a situation in
which a liberal conception of justice does not exist. One is a country in which a religious
group considers an existing liberal constitution as a modus vivendi, when it cannot have
its way, but would dismantle it and impose its religion as the sole state religion, if it had
the power to do so. The other is a country in which a religious or non-religious group is
“prepared to resist laws that they think undermine their positions” if its doctrine is “losing
ground in influence and numbers” (1997, 589).
Finally, what role does diversity have in liberal thought? A template liberal state that is
“culture-blind” permits, but does not require diversity, by granting freedom of religion,
speech and association under a common set of laws. The emphasis in liberalism is on
extending the menu from which individuals can choose. Limiting the opportunities for
diversity is wrong as is requiring diversity unless the limitations overcome barriers to
individual freedoms including that of association. This qualification and how to govern
the transition of children to politically enfranchised individuals divide the reasoning
liberals in Rawls’s work. His interest is in establishing a political arrangement for a civil
determination of policy in these liberally contested areas. In contrast we view
constitutions as constantly developing through an accumulation of small changes
punctuated by more significant shifts. Ideas, cultural forces, economic interests, and
political constitutions are interdependently determined.
Compromise and history
The “working” constitutions of modern democracies reflect understandings and historical
accommodations that often compromise liberal values of either stripe. The compromises
typically involve the details of the electoral system, the architecture of electoral systems
and legislative institutions, and the degree of dispersion of authority among the political
system’s functional parts. Some citizens are also privileged by decisions establishing the
official languages for use in assemblies, courts and the administration of law and by the
granting of privileged positions to their religions. These decisions typically favour
members of a few “official” cultures (O cultures). In some countries minority “heritage”
cultures (H cultures) are also singled out and treated differently, but not necessarily in a
privileged manner, by the working constitution.
                                                                                                                                                
“apparent conflict between freedom and equality” his goal is to establish “the just form of basic
institutions within a democratic society under modern conditions.”
18 A conception of political justice governs discourse among citizens on political issues, within the
bureaucracy, and among candidates in elections as well as the political thinking and belief structure of
each citizen. It requires reciprocity and civility.
8The special position of the O and H cultures is institutionalized through administrative
practice, constitutional provision, or treaty commitments. The H cultures are often
aboriginal or migratory populations that are in the vulnerable position of depending on
the courts of the established political system to interpret their relationship with the state.19
The identity of O and H cultures in formerly colonized democracies reflected their pre-
colonial history, experiences of different groups under colonialism, and the process by
which independence was achieved. In these countries, some of the H cultures under
colonial rule became O cultures and some cultures that were privileged under colonialism
as administrators lost status.20
By the 1970s, new political pressures and an accompanying body of thought,
multiculturalism, began to impact on the working constitutions of democracies.
Multiculturalism
Proponents of multiculturalism maintain that democratic structures professing liberal
roots suppress important cultural differences and favour the dominant O cultures. The
special status of O and H cultures provides de facto legal recognition of group as
compared to individual rights. A just society requires the recognition of group rights for
more cultures (the R cultures) in policy decisions. In the following discussion, we
distinguish between two stylized schools of multiculturalism, strong and moderate, that
use different criteria for identifying R cultures, have distinct views on the role of the
state, and consequently pursue a differentiated set of policies.
Strong multiculturalists
Strong multiculturalists believe that a broad set of political and legal functions should be
devolved from the state and become the responsibility of the O, H and R cultures. Their R
partition emphasizes cultures, such as some ethnic and religious communities, that have a
thick web of norms, rules and enforcement mechanisms, For these cultures, devolving
responsibility for activities like education and at least some aspects of the justice system
                                                
19 For example, in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997], the majority opinion (3 to 2) of the Supreme
Court of Canada interpreted that the federal government had the power to extinguish aboriginal title:
“Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (the federal power to legislate in respect of Indians)
carries with it the jurisdiction to legislate in relation to aboriginal title, and by implication, the
jurisdiction to extinguish it.”. The majority also stated that the Canadian provinces could regulate
activities under their control that affect those holding aboriginal title as long as the laws are of general
application and do not touch on “"Indianness" or the "core of Indianness".”
20 Hirschman’s discussion (1967) of trait-taking v trait-making in assessing staffing policy of the Nigerian
railway in the 1960s illustrates the reversal of status of some cultures on independence. The members
of the Ibo tribe disproportionately filled lower administrative positions under British rule and moved
up when the expatriate managers left. The “northerners” who were more numerous and had a
corresponding weight in the new government initiated “affirmative” action programs to replace Ibos in
management with members of their underrepresented tribes. The necessity of working together in
management did not mitigate intertribal hostility. As Hirschman’s book went into print, the Ibos
created a breakaway state, Biafra, following a massacre of Ibo migrants working in the north. The new
state of Biafra also contained significant oil fields. A bloody civil war followed and the region was
reabsorbed into Nigeria.
9is feasible and desirable.21 When there is a conflict between actions that are important to
an R culture and national laws, the “default” position of strong multiculturalists is that
national laws should give way. If, for example, a religion illegally restricts the rights of
employment of women in certain establishments run by its members, the state should
defer and exempt the culture from having to obey the national law.22 In short, the
religion’s “group rights” trump national laws over a broad domain of issues. Strong
multiculturalists oppose a mandatory separation of religion from the state.23 A secular
state privileges non-religious values and decreases opportunities for fulfillment to those
who do not hold those values in high regard.24 They accept asymmetries in the state’s
relations to different religions.25
National policies should be determined by negotiation among the O, H, and R cultures.
The mechanism of adjudication among the interests of the different cultures is typically
sketched in lightly. Negotiations are disciplined by the right of a country’s H, O and R
cultures to opt out of a wide set of national policies and laws. The national state is
                                                
21 Tahir Mahood writes that “organised religions can make a case for a state-funded school but not an
ethnic or ‘racial’ group” and that communities defined by or organised by religion “may turn out to be
the only post-immigration groups who are sufficiently distinct to be candidates for corporate
representation and collective rights.”
22 In our polarized representation, strong multiculturalists would not have the state intervene except in rare
circumstances. Kukathas (1992, 1996), for example, makes no significant qualifications. His state has
no coercive power and recedes in importance. Kukathas’s position seems very similar to that of Hayek
in The Road to Serfdom (Hayek changes his constitutional prescription and its philosophical
foundation in his later writings, e.g., Hayek (1979, 1988)).
23 “Liberals cannot consistently be dogmatic about their own beliefs and sceptical about all others, or talk
about an open-minded dialogue yet both exclude some and conduct the dialogue on their own terms.”
(Parekh, 1995, 97)
24 In contrast, Rawls distinguishes between political justice as a reasonable conception for “the basic
structure of a just constitutional regime” and a “comprehensive doctrine.” (1988, 460) Political justice
is a basic structure that allows an individual to choose among a comprehensive conception of the good
(includes many religions). He admits that “diversity” (not his term but appropriate in this paper) of
outcome is affected by the constitution (consistent with the view of political justice) in two ways.
Some comprehensive conceptions of the good may be forbidden in the name of political justice; others
may be allowed but not survive. The constitution is not neutral in effect but “is unjustly biased against
certain comprehensive conceptions only if, say, individualistic ones alone can endure in a liberal
society, or they so predominate that associations affirming values of religion or community cannot
flourish, and further, if the conditions leading to this outcome are themselves unjust, in view of present
and foreseeable circumstances.” (1988, 464)
25 Bhikhu Parekh (1997, 19), for example, argues that Britain “…now has a sizeable number of religious
minorities with their own distinct histories and traditions, about which they feel just as strongly as the
rest of Britain’s citizens do about theirs. The minorities are an equal and integral part of British
society, and deserve not only equal religious and other rights but also an official acknowledgement of
their presence in both the symbols of the state and the dominant definition of national identity. The
acknowledgement cannot be equal, not so much because the minority religious communities are
numerically unequal as because they have not shaped the British identity as decisively as Christianity
has, are not an equally deep and persuasive presence in British political culture, and do not form as
integral and central a part of British society as does Christianity.” He considers that altering British law
to protect all religions against “blasphemy,” instead of just the established church, “has most to be said
in its favour” (1997, 20).
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consequently small—restricted to administering the negotiated settlements among the
constituent cultures in the country and national policies for those cultures that have not
opted out.26 Cultures are the major players in governance. The state is an administrative
centre to facilitate negotiation and administer existing agreements among the cultures. If
negotiation breaks down, each culture does its own thing without any “management” of
the interactions. There may be no agreement to form a national army, for example. In this
case, attack from outside is met by patching together a coalition of cultural militia.27
Strong multiculturalists believe that peaceful negotiated agreement among cultures within
a country is feasible and, if encouraged, promotes a greater diversity of cultures than has
been typically experienced historically within the democracies of Europe, North America
and Asia.28
It is difficult to delimit the type of constitution that would best serve a strong
multicultural country. A negotiating set of protocols and precedents would be useful.
Councils of representatives from the participating cultures could supervise and arrange
the financing of national policies for those cultures that have opted in. The complicated
machinery for making political decisions will lie within each culture. For the resulting
country to be considered democratic requires that most of the participating cultures use
democratic procedures internally but most religious cultures, for example, are not
democratic in their governance.
Multiculturalists of both schools emphasise that diversity is a goal, a result to be valued,29
in comparison to liberals who extol the freedom to choose over a diverse menu. The two
multiculturalism schools differ in the degree of diversity that they support. Strong
multiculturalists recommend that diversity not be constrained while moderate
multiculturalists accept limits to diversity.
Moderate multiculturalists
Moderate multiculturalists welcome exceptions from national laws or devolutions of
                                                
26 If cultures were territorially concentrated, separate political entities would be feasible and opting in
would occur over specified activities such as a regional trade agreement. Another model recognises the
federation as the state but there is extensive devolution to “junior” governments as in the Swiss
federation. The wicked problems for multiculturalism occur when territorial concentration is
incomplete as is the case between the Flemish and French cultures in Belgium. Barry (2001, 312-13)
comments on the Belgium case: “But the endless process of haggling that is Belgian politics is so
nauseating to all concerned that it is widely thought that the country would already have broken up if it
were not for the problem posed by Brussels—a Francophone enclave in Flemish territory that is too big
a prize for either side to be willing to relinquish.”
27 Uncoordinated policies by each culture can generate conflict. The probability of violence among the
militias of the affected cultures is high. For security reasons cultures will cluster territorially and this
physical segregations increases the chance of political separation.
28 For example, Bhikhu Parekh (1995, 97) writes: “Unless a theory of man recognizes the legitimacy of
deep differences and gives them an ontological status, it cannot avoid setting up narrow norms and
throwing up inegalitarian and even imperialist impulses. Obviously, we cannot tolerate all differences,
but the determining principle should be dialogically derived and consensually grounded, not arbitrarily
imposed by a narrowly defined liberalism.”
29 Diversity plays a similar role in the multicultural lexicon as freedom does in the liberal.
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authority to R cultures that are approved by democratic processes. They favour a working
constitution and supporting norms that allow the negotiation of political deals among O,
H, and R cultures and other interest groups within the legislative system. They
presumably recognize but do not emphasise that requests for exceptions or devolutions
that offend basic values of the O cultures have little chance of being enacted. Proponents
of moderate multiculturalism also support state policies to promote better communication
among cultures within the country as a means of reducing social and employment
discrimination. In their opinion, the state should encourage better ways of resolving the
set of “real” conflicts among groups and promote a national identity that celebrates the
diversity of cultures within the country. Their “teaching” emphasis extends to informing
the O cultures of the situation and contributions of the R cultures and encouraging them
to respond “appropriately” in political life. Their views on policy add complications—
mostly symbolic or minor exceptions in law, adaptations in the practices of common
institutions and the funding of teaching civics out of school—to the core of policies that
would have been.
Moderate multiculturalists define R cultures more in terms of skin colour, gender, and
identity than religion.30 They support a large and complex role for the state. Their
political agenda includes affirmative action programs and public teaching campaigns that
focus on racism and gender prejudice as well as more targeted initiatives that inform
disadvantaged groups, e.g., recent immigrants, about how to articulate and participate
effectively within the political-legal system. In general moderate multiculturalists respect
separate spaces for state and religion but support some distinctions in policy related to
different religions and sensitivity in designing protocols (holidays, dress codes, etc.) in
state schools.31 The recommended constitution is hierarchal. O and H cultures represent
nations of people and have a historical claim plus an inner imperative to control a number
of political activities that affect their “nationals.” Immigrant cultures on the other hand do
not have a legitimate claim for the degree of self-government granted to O cultures and to
a lesser extent to H cultures.
Initial conditions and the evolution of working constitutions
Working constitutions are what they are because of historical compromises. They evolve
through further bargaining among the O, H and R cultures within the country and the
influence of new ideas. This evolution is influenced by the reinterpretation of the
constitution that occurs simultaneously with the determination of specific policies within
it. Stanley Fish has addressed this nexus—the simultaneous reaching of a conclusion on
an issue and the definition of the process in a variety of competitive processes. One that
he discusses at some length governs what is “in” and “out” in the mainstream
                                                
30 For example, “people of colour,” women, and identity groups such as gays who share a concern about
discrimination but are not linked by the same thick web of relationships and institutions as a religion.
31 As an example, a moderate multiculturalist might argue for an exception to dress codes of a police force
prohibiting beards and turbans should be created for Sikhs because they are symbols of Sikh
nationality but against an exception for the wearing of another Sikh religious symbol, the Kirpan, a
small sword or dagger (In its examples of usage of the word kirpan, the Oxford English Dictionary
includes “1971 Daily Tel. 11 June 3 (caption) Sant Mann Singh,..a visiting Sikh religious leader who
has agreed not to carry his kirpan, a sword, in public.”).
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methodology of a discipline.32
It is true that there is nowhere to go, no locus of judgment to which disputants can appeal
for an authoritative announcement. But this doesn’t mean that they must throw up their
hands or toss the dice; it means that they must argue, thrash it out, present bodies of
evidence to one another and to relevant audiences, try to change one another’s mind. To
be sure, the process is not guided by any unchallengeable authority, but authority, not
unchallengeable but temporarily regnant, is what is fashioned in the course of it. That is
to say, authority does not preside over the debate from a position outside it but is the
prize for which the debaters vie. (1994, 10-11)
The processes of distinguishing among political theories, determining the influence of
different cultures in the governance of a country, and influencing the policy agenda are
similar in his mind to that of shaping what is taught in English literature classes. In Fish’s
words: “(D)emocracy is simply a name for the canon-making process” (1994, 47).33 This
process describes what economists might call a “marketplace for ideas” in which
rhetorical entrepreneurs compete to win over relevant audiences. Each side manipulates
the categories of debate and the meaning of terms to their advantage; accuses the other
side of so doing; and denies its own culpability.34
                                                
32 Toni Morrison expresses a similar view on relativism and that all discourse is value-laden. One
interpretation of her views on university teaching is that this part of the “marketplace of ideas” should
be regulated. Teachers should disclose bias in a manner similar to regulations requiring food
manufacturers to provide information about ingredients on labels: “We teach values by having them.
Whether or not we drive or seduce or persuade others to share them, whether or not we are indifferent
to or accommodating to the ethics of others, whether we are amused by the concept of value being
teachable, whether we are open to being argued into supporting values contrary to those we have held--
all of these possibilities and strategies matter. The innate feature of the university is that not only does
it examine, it also produces power-laden and value-ridden discourse. Much scholarship is often, even
habitually, entangled in or regulated by ideology. Since, as humanists we know that that is the case,
acknowledgment is preferable to the mask of disinterest.” Lecture on the teaching of values in the
university, given at Princeton University on April 27, 2000. Unfortunately biases cannot be determined
with the precision of chemical analyses. Professor Morrison makes no explicit acknowledgement of
her own biases and on reflection we don’t see how she or anyone else might credibly do so. Regulation
in this marketplace has to be limited to third party determination that some content is out of bounds as
is done in “hate laws” and in censorship based on “community values.” We interpret her remarks not to
be a call for disclosure by professors but as affirming Fish’s view that all discourse is unavoidably
value-laden.
33 The canon is the evolving professional consensus about what are the “great books” of a culture.
34 Fish argues that entry to audiences is always controlled in one way or another. He approves of the terms
of access to audiences in English literature, a debating forum in which he has had great success. He
was also a participant in a broader discourse with the public on what ought to be taught in English
programs and affirmative action hiring policies. On this front his positions were not having the same
success. Consequently, his rhetorical attention shifted from the issue to the difficulty that sound ideas
had in receiving a fair hearing in this debate. He accuses his ideological opponents—labelled as
neoconservatives—of maintaining as given that there is fair competition among expressions of ideas
“without regard to content” in this “marketplace for ideas” (1994, 17). His condemnation of the use of
the term “marketplace for ideas” by his debating opponents provides a vivid example of this two-
pronged rhetorical competition by a master player. To him, many of the phrases used by the other side
are encoded, e.g., “`Race-neutral' and `color-blind' are just two more of the coded phrases by means of
which Martin Luther King’s legacy is not honored but betrayed” (1994, 100). Like the enigma machine
the decoder is only applied to the enemy’s messages.
13
The formation of public opinion on issues in a democracy may be similar to the canon-
making process but the influence of that opinion on policies depends on the existing
working constitution and a country’s history. Since the working constitutions of most, if
not all, democracies favour some O cultures and provide H cultures with special political
or legal rights, the starting point for introducing multicultural policies is not an idealized
liberal state but a muddled compromise. In this setting, introducing some multicultural
measures may have a beneficial effect viewed from a liberal perspective.35
The theoretical debates among supporters of different schools of liberalism and
multiculturalism have undoubtedly influenced the evolution of working constitutions in
many countries as democratic politicians search for new ideas to offer voters. In our
configuration, libertarians and strong multiculturalists both favour negotiated
arrangements and a limited state while social democrats and modest multiculturalists
support a strong state and disagree on the constitutional limitations to be imposed on it.
Just as the canon evolves relatively slowly and its path is affected by its current state, so
it is for the working constitution. Another commonality in the two processes is that those
participating in the determination of change—English professors and legislators—often
have a direct interest in the outcome. The constraints on the decision-makers differ as
legislators are elected to represent a constituency. The influence of different
constituencies—members of the O, H and R cultures—is mediated through the working
constitution. The existing working constitution, cultural mixes, nature of the economy,
and historical experiences govern the response of the working constitution to a shock
from a freshly articulated political view. How would we expect these factors to influence
the impact of multiculturalist advocates on the working constitution?
Currently, the starting situation in most democracies is a state that actively participates in
the organized economy, regulates general economic and social interactions and
redistributes income. The state is not small nor a mere administrator of cultural treaties.
Government employees, those working in government-financed activities like education
and a host of private interests complementary to state activities are a collective force in a
modern democracy. They are as unenthusiastic about a minimalist state as they are
enthusiastic about new state initiatives. The ease of adding or subtracting multicultural
elements to a working constitution depends on the complexity of political deals that it
supports, its structure, the mix of different cultures, and historical experience.
Consider the political situation of an ethnic or religious culture that is not an O or H
culture but is significant enough in size to be among the R cultures recognized by
moderate multiculturalists. A host of general and some particular national policies affect
                                                
35 The granting of establishment status to a church of an O culture is equivalent to subsidizing its
expansion. Recognizing some other churches as part of the national religious establishment may
establish a pattern of affiliation that is “closer to” that which would rule in a “pure” liberal constitution
just as introducing subsidies on other products may improve traditionally measured economic welfare
if a particular product is already being subsidized. The classic reference in economics is Lipsey and
Lancaster, 1956-7.
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its members and their group.36 Pursuing a particular piece of legislation—an exception or
devolution—is often less politically attractive than joining with other groups to lobby for
favourable shifts in general policies. The relative attraction of spending political capital
on general policies is reinforced by the difficulty of obtaining support for an exception or
devolution from other R cultures.37 The R culture’s chance of obtaining an exception in
law or a devolution of responsibility is further reduced if it threatens the existing rights of
the O cultures or reduces the political potency of the H cultures.
In contrast, multicultural policies that complement the interests of the O cultures are
much more likely to be accepted. For example, if the O cultures in the country actively
support and promote immigration, they are also likely to support policies that make the
adjustment of immigrant groups into the society and in particular the economy less
traumatic without unduly threatening the role of the existing official languages or the O
cultures’ representational guarantees in governing bodies. If existing immigrant
communities are considered to be involved in criminal activities, such as the drug trade or
gang activities, some multicultural initiatives may complement law enforcement. Policies
that publicize the positive achievements of ethnic communities will often be part of such
initiatives. They provide evidence to the ethnic group of approbation from other groups
within the country. Such policies of “recognition” also earn support from members of the
O cultures that value cosmopolitanism (food, art, ideas, …), but fear that exceptions and
devolutions may ultimately threaten the stability of current political relations.
Who initiates complementary multicultural policies is not important, if the potential
support is unaffected by the source of the proposal. The qualifying clause often fails to
hold. Political entrepreneurs in the O cultures are perhaps more likely to be the initiators
because voters in the O cultures will find the claims of benefits for them more credible
when it is advocated by “their” politicians. Multicultural policies of recognition that are
clearly bounded and unlikely to be the “thin edge of the wedge” of strong
multiculturalism have a “warm glow” attraction to the O cultures and are most likely to
be adopted.
The impact of national multicultural policy on the cultural industries is of particular
importance to this paper. How would one expect multicultural policy to affect regulatory
decisions—the allocation of rights to over-the-air television and radio stations or for
specialty channels, allocations of subsidy funds, definitions of national content for
quotas, and the like. We expect the same forces to play in this area of policy as in the
more general policy arena. An R culture will be competitive with other R cultures for
exceptions or devolutions particular to itself. Little will happen that is not complementary
to the interests of the O cultures. Overall, the policies that have a multicultural aspect to
them that are likely to be implemented have to be in the interest of the O cultures. Most
                                                
36 An exception about school ages granted to an Anabaptist sect, for example, will be important to that
community, but so will sanitary rules, environmental and other laws governing farming, the building of
roads that allow farm products to be marketed, conscription, and in some cases laws governing
cooperatives.
37 A Hindu minority is unlikely to expend its political capital on having a holy day in Islam recognized as a
national holiday.
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of these would be implemented under the working constitution in the absence of an
official embrace of multiculturalism policy.
We estimate the limits of the impact of multiculturalist policies on the policies of a
democratic state by looking at the experiences of Canada. Canada is our choice for the
following reasons. It was the first developed democracy to declare officially a policy of
multiculturalism in 1971. Similar policies have been introduced at the provincial and
municipal level. It also has the characteristics that make a particular blend of
multicultural policies attractive. For the past three decades, Canada has actively
encouraged immigration. It has also been evangelical about multiculturalist policy and of
its approach to negotiating the meaning of aboriginal rights with its indigenous peoples in
international fora.38 In the next section, we briefly describe and assess what Canada has
done on the multicultural front, while adding some observations from other experiences.
Canadian multiculturalism—an upper bound?
In 1971 the Canadian government announced that it was adopting a multicultural policy.
At the time of the announcement, there was no developed multicultural policy agenda
ready to be implemented. The announcement was rather a political signal to those that
were not privileged by the introduction of official bilingualism two years earlier that the
government would do something for them.39 Government officials subsequently filled the
policy void by:
a. developing special programs to integrate immigrants and their children
b. modifying practices in common institutions to be more tolerant of diversity in
customs
c. introducing affirmative action employment programs in universities and other
government funded institutions
d. promoting sensitivity to different holy days in educational institutions and other
government agencies
e. encouraging anti-racial initiatives in general and in the schools and the workplace
in particular
f. establishing diversity training programs for police and those delivering health
services
g. regulating broadcasters to avoid ethnic stereotypes
h. altering literature and history curricula to recognize the contribution of H and R
                                                
38 Kymlicka (1998, 1), who has written widely on multiculturalism and strongly supports the Canadian
policies, notes that Canada’s per capita rate of immigration is much higher than that of the United
States and its proportion of foreign-born people is 16%, twice that of the United States. He writes that
“Canada is now seen as a model by many other countries” (1998, 3) and that Australia and New
Zealand followed Canada’s lead in adopting official multicultural policies that were “explicitly
modelled on Canada’s” (1998, 56). With respect to its Aboriginal peoples Kymlicka reports that “(t)he
provisions relating to Aboriginal peoples in Canada’s 1982 constitution—both those sections affirming
the existence of Aboriginal rights and the section requiring the government to negotiate the meaning of
these rights with the Aboriginal people themselves—are virtually unique in the world” (1998, 1).
39 See the Official Languages Act introduced in that year. Representative multicultural initiatives of the
federal government are listed at http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/multi/main_e.shtml .
16
cultures
i. funding of ethnic festivals and study programs40
Multicultural policies were given statutory sanction in 1988 with the passing of the
Multiculturalism Act. It begins with a preamble of “whereas” clauses listing the liberal
values that government policy already in place embraced.41 Other “whereas” clauses add
to this list by noting specific commitments that Canada is committed to:
 ensure “that every individual should have an equal opportunity with other
individuals to make the life that the individual is able and wishes to have” under
the Canadian Human Rights Act
 “redress any proscribed discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of
race, national or ethnic origin or colour” by being a party to the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
 provide “that persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities shall
not be denied the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their
own religion or to use their own language” by its adherence to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Another preamble clause restates the 1971 commitment of adding to this extensive set of
protections by adopting a multicultural policy that “recognizes the diversity of Canadians
as regards race, national or ethnic origin, colour and religion as a fundamental
characteristic of Canadian society” subject to “working to achieve the equality of all
Canadians in the economic, social, cultural and political life of Canada.”
The Act then outlines the scope of Canadian multiculturalism policy in a series of
subsections. Some call for the government to respect existing rights and provide services
in a way that is “respectful and inclusive of Canada's multicultural character” but most
require it to recognize, encourage and promote the diversity of the achievements and
expressions of different cultures within Canada. One subsection that promises to
“preserve and enhance the use of languages other than English and French” might be
substantive if it were not for the qualifying clause that immediately follows it—“ while
strengthening the status and use of the official languages of Canada.” The next subsection
reinforces that qualifying clause by assuring the Canadian O cultures that
                                                
40 The list is gleaned from reports on multiculturalism available on the Canadian Heritage web site.
Kymlicka (1998, 42-43) lists thirteen multicultural policies that reflect “the sorts of issues that are
raised in the public debate over multiculturalism, and have been adopted or at least seriously proposed
by government parliamentary reports or royal commissions.” He notes that his list includes policies
that were not included in federal multicultural policy.
41The commitments listed include: equality before and under the law, equal protection and benefit of the
law without discrimination, and freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief, opinion, expression,
peaceful assembly and association, and an equal opportunity with other individuals to make the life
that the individual is able and wishes to have. Other whereas clauses note that Canada was already a
member of
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multiculturalism will be advanced “in harmony with the national commitment to the
official languages of Canada.”
The Act then instructs federal institutions to:
a) ensure that Canadians of all origins have an equal opportunity to obtain
employment and advancement in those institutions;
b) promote policies, programs and practices that enhance the ability of individuals
and communities of all origins to contribute to the continuing evolution of
Canada;
c) promote policies, programs and practices that enhance the understanding of and
respect for the diversity of the members of Canadian society
d) collect statistical data in order to enable the development of policies, programs
and practices that are sensitive and responsive to the multicultural reality of
Canada
e) make use, as appropriate, of the language skills and cultural understanding of
individuals of all origins
f) generally, carry on their activities in a manner that is sensitive and responsive to
the multicultural reality of Canada.42
If the federal institutions were not following a) they were culpable under existing
Canadian law and policy. If the government was not following subsections d), e) and f), it
was guilty of bad management. This leaves b) and c). These clauses instruct the
government to promote recognition of Canadian diversity and to enhance the ability of
everyone in Canada to contribute to its continuing evolution. The first is an educational
order; a statute is hardly necessary. The second has the substance of puff pastry.
Statutes can be imprecisely related to the policies that they sanction. Perhaps Canadian
multicultural policy in practice has not limited itself to exhorting the value of
multiculturalism, aiding immigrant communities to participate in the Canadian political
system, and improving their ability to adjust to Canadian society but been more intrusive.
An examination of a sample of projects funded under Canadian Multicultural policy
posted on the Canadian Heritage website provides information about how it has been
spending the multicultural budget. The projects are grouped under three headings:
national (12 projects), regional (19 projects) and international (2 projects). The titles of
the national projects are listed in Table 1.
The Department classifies each program as contributing to—elimination of racism and
discrimination, participation, and awareness and understanding or some combination of
these. A reading of the more detailed description of each of the national programs reveals
that none of these policies grant exemptions from law or devolutions of responsibility.
Some support social democratic values of anti-racism, equal access, and alleviation of
poverty or provide R cultures with information on parenting or participating in the labour
                                                
42 These are subsections (a) to (f) of section 3(2) of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act.
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market43 that complement the interests and values of Canadian O cultures. Two of these
projects involved the cultural industries. In the project, The Colour of your Money, the
Canadian Advertising Foundation, two large media companies, the Department of
Canadian Heritage, a private consulting firm and a university researcher, John Samuels,
“undertook a series of research projects and produced an information package to
encourage and expand the inclusion of Canadians of diverse origins, and especially
people of colour, in advertising.” The partners in the The Colour of your Money initiative
includes important mainstream (O-culture) commercial players and associations. The
second Cultural Diversity and Museums aimed “to increase the capacity of museums to
work with diverse cultural communities and, at the same time, to increase public
awareness and appreciation for Canada's growing pluralism and changing identity.”
Table 1




The Colour of Your Money X
Working Group on Racial Equality in the Legal Profession X
Seminar on Dissemination of Hate in Canada via Computer Technology X
Cultural Diversity and Museums X X
Parenting in Canada X X
Ethnocultural Diversity: A Source of Competitive Advantage X
March 21 Campaign X X
Demographic Profiles of Black communities in Canada X X
Demographic Contours of Poverty among Canadian Ethnic Groups X X
Citizenship Participation Initiative: Introduction to the Canadian justice
system
X X
The Canadian Languages Network X
Research project: "The economic and Ideological Bases of Racism
towards Recent Chinese Immigrants to Vancouver"
X X
* Canadian Heritage classifies each project into one or more of three categories. We have encoded them as:
A: Elimination of racism and discrimination, B: Participation, and C: Awareness and understanding.
Source: http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/multi/program/projects_e.shtml
The 17 regional programs had a similar orientation to the national set but were more
often designed to defuse a specific problem of interest to both the H culture involved and
the O cultures.44 Three of the regional projects involved cultural activities. Between
                                                
43 The project Ethnocultural Diversity: A Source of Competitive Advantage, for example, gathered over 100
businesses, including some of Canada’s largest firms, trade and industry associations, the Conference
Board of Canada, and the Canadian Ethnocultural Council “to identify mechanisms through which
Canadian organizations can recognize and use Canada's linguistic and cultural diversity to best
advantage both at home and abroad.”
44 For example, the project Promoting good relations in the Markham and Richmond Hill areas addresses
racial tension in these two towns on the outskirts of Toronto, “which have experienced a large influx of
Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong in the past few years. To help promote cross-cultural
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Culture Arts Dialogue 1996, organized a “series of readings, exhibitions, performances
and workshops in music, dance, literature, visual arts, storytelling, theatre, photography,
radio art and public art involving artists from many diverse cultures” in London, Ontario.
In another project Publication and Teacher’s Guide to Combat Racism, a Manitoba
educator/illustrator, Bob Haverluck, prepared a 24-page anti-racism comic book. The
third project, Teslin Tlingit Theatre Troop, was a cooperative project with the Department
of Education of the Yukon. Students at two community schools of the Teslin Tlingit, an
Indian tribe (H culture), “undertook the writing and production of a play that discussed
race relations issues affecting their community” and performed their works at the Festival
of Yukon Youth Theatre.
The two international initiatives organized and funded university chairs, centres of
excellence at selected universities, and conferences related to multiculturalism. Neither
involved the cultural industries.
All of these projects could have been funded and administered under existing agencies
and statutory authorizations without an official multicultural policy. The relatively few
projects that involved the arts and creative activities were not competitive with
mainstream commercial interests and would not exercise the core of the official cultures.
The museum initiative spoke to the administrators of government and not-for-profit
organizations about the characteristics of their country. The advertising project would
arguably make commercial messages more effective with a group of growing economic
importance.
The federal government’s estimates of spending on grants to non-profit organizations,
universities, institutions and individuals for promoting multiculturalism in the fiscal year
2002-2003 is $14,383,22445, which represents a 10% reduction from the previous fiscal
year. To put this figure in perspective, Canadian Heritage’s total estimate of two
programs supporting the use of the two official languages (O-culture support) in non-
federal administration and other quasi-public institutions was $233,479,03646 and its
estimate for contributions to various aboriginal (H group) centers, societies and
                                                                                                                                                
understanding and harmonious race relations, the Chinese Canadian National Council - Toronto
Chapter undertook a series of activities, including a) an exhibition of Chinese Canadian history in
Canada during a major event to celebrate Chinese New Year, b) several discussion opportunities in
various schools to increase the students' awareness of the race relations issues affecting the community
in general and Chinese Canadians in particular, and c) exhibitions and other activities in two shopping
malls to promote dialogue among different communities.”
45 The dollars are Canadian unless indicated otherwise. The Canadian dollar at the end of the day on May 9,
2002 was worth US$.64.
46 This figure is the sum of estimates for two items: contributions to programs relating to the use of official
languages in areas of provincial and territorial competence; including programs of summer language
bursaries and assistance to independent schools and to associations of independent schools of
$217,841,716 and contributions to organizations representing official language minority communities,
non-federal public administrations and other organizations for the purpose of furthering the use,
acquisition and promotion of the official languages of $15,637,320.
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associations was $50,003,38647.
Turning to the cultural industries, was their regulation significantly affected by
multicultural policy in Canada? In other words, did multiculturalism affect decisions at
the many nodes of discretion in cultural policy? The broadcasting regulator held public
hearings and issued statements of its multilingual and ethnic broadcasting policy in 1985
and again in 1999. A number of radio, television and specialty/pay television channels
were licensed under these guidelines. The conditions of licence included stipulating a
minimum number of ethnic groups that each radio and television station must serve and a
minimum number of languages for the programming.
Allocations of rights to broadcast and privileged position in gaining access to cable
systems were contested vigorously in the pre-digital broadcasting era. The CRTC granted
licences to a multicultural television channel in Toronto, 48 CFMT, in 1978 and made
corollary decisions that made its signal available to over 70% of the province of Ontario.
Multicultural over-the-air channels like CFMT compete with specialized ethnic cable
channels to be included on desirable tiers on cable systems. Telelatino, which broadcasts
in Spanish and Italian, and Chinavision, which primarily broadcasts to a Chinese
audience, were among the first set of national specialty channels licensed in 1984.49 The
CRTC allowed the channels to carry a percentage of non-ethnic programming in English
or French. Advertising on this portion of their airtime generated revenues that cross-
subsidised ethnic programming. Over their history, these services have experienced
frequent periods of financial stress.
The CRTC uses a 60-40 formula—60% of programming must be ethnic programming
while the rest can be in either English or French—as a guideline in regulating
multicultural channels. The 40% English or French language “right” is the major source
of rents for subsidising the 60% ethnic programming.50 Conventional stations and
                                                
47 The line item reads: Contributions to Aboriginal associations, Aboriginal women’s groups, Aboriginal
community groups, Aboriginal communication societies, Aboriginal friendship centres and
associations specifically representing Aboriginal friendship centers.
48 Toronto is Canada’s largest and most ethnically diverse city. In it’s a call for comments in preparing its
1999 statement of policy the CRTC noted “Approximately 33% of Toronto residents report the
exclusive use in the home of a language other than French or English.” Public Notice CRTC 1998-135,
Ottawa, 22 December 1998.
49 They are licensed as a category of specialty channel that may but need not be included in a cable
company’s basic services. Chinavision did not begin as a national channel as it was not allowed to
offer its service in British Columbia. Shortly after its launch it was given permission to do so. It then
became competitive with Cathay International, which had been licensed (only in BC) to broadcast in
Mandarin, Cantonese, Hindi, Vietnamese, and Thai in 1982. The two were brought under common
ownership in 1993.
50 In discussing the 60-40 guideline, the CRTC stated: “This approach ensures that ethnic stations primarily
serve ethnic communities. However, it allows an ethnic station to establish a business model under
which 40% of its schedule may be non-ethnic programming in order to generate revenues required to
support its ethnic programming.” Public Notice CRTC 1999-117, Ottawa, 16 July 1999. There is a
hierarchy of cross-subsidies within the system (In 1987 CFMT described the flow as coming “from
conventional English-language programming and programming to major cultural groups as the Italians,
Portuguese, Greek and Asians” “to - cross-subsidize programming to smaller ethnic communities
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networks and other ethnic services intervene in licensing procedures or complain to the
CRTC in separate actions about the intrusion into their advertising turf, positioning in the
cable service tiers, and the like. The profit potential of the existing ethnic channels has
been rising with the growth of their communities and falling with the significant decrease
in scarcity as digital over-the-air, cable, and Internet broadcasting expands.51 In addition,
the CRTC moderates profit and losses by altering an ethnic station’s Canadian content
requirement. These requirements were originally quite low as the domestic capacity to
provide programming in many languages was in its infancy but they have since steadily
risen. The CRTC’s Canadian content guidelines for the ethnic services are currently the
same as for conventional broadcasters, although some relaxation typically occurs in the
licensing process depending on the perceived economic situation of the service.52
The ownership of ethnic services is not explicitly restricted to members or companies
controlled by members of the communities served. For example, Rogers Broadcasting
Limited, a subsidiary of Canada’s largest cable and media company, acquired controlling
interest of CFMT in 1986. Subsequently, decisions on permitting retransmission sites and
inclusion in attractive cable tiers have extended its audience significantly. In its recent
licence renewal decision, the CRTC noted that it was the only profitable Canadian over-
the-air ethnic television station (Decision CRTC 2000-772 Ottawa, 21 December 2000).
Allowing transfer of the constrained licences of ethnic stations to owners that can better
serve their audiences would be unobjectionable to most economists but presents the
Canadian policy makers with a dilemma. Foreign ownership is prohibited in this sector.
Among the rationales offered for this policy is that Canadian management reinforces
content constraints in providing “Canadian” material. The logic of this argument requires
that the owners of ethnic stations should come from the cultures that they serve. Andrew
Cardozo, a CRTC commissioner, appealed to that logic in his dissenting opinion on the
licence renewal of CFTM in 2000:
Owning CFMT-TV also gives Rogers a multilingual image in the Greater Toronto Area
which is becoming increasingly multicultural and multilingual, even while the upper
echelons of Rogers do not reflect this diversity. (Decision CRTC 2000-772 Ottawa, 21
December 2000)
                                                                                                                                                
including Spanish, Ukrainian, Korean, Arabic, Black and Japanese.” (Decision CRTC 87-739, Ottawa,
10 September 1987)), the simpler generalization aggregates these flows.
51 At the beginning of 2000, the CRTC announced that digital specialty channels not required to be carried
by cable companies would be licensed on a more open-entry basis. More specifically all such
applications that met basic licensing criteria would be licensed even if competitive services existed
(CRTC Public Notice 2000-6, Ottawa, 13 January 2000).
52 In its restatement of ethnic broadcasting policy in 1999 the CRTC noted: “The Commission will continue
to require that ethnic television stations broadcast the same minimum Canadian content levels as non-
ethnic private television stations (60% Canadian content overall, 50% during the evening broadcast
period) (Public Notice CRTC 1999-117 Ottawa, 16 July 1999). These requirements may, however, be
varied by the Commission for any ethnic television station by condition of licence.” In its licence
renewal of CFMT in the next year, the Commission increased the Canadian content requirements by
5% over five years but the increased level remains below the guideline after consideration of “the
licensee's commitments, the economic circumstances of the market it serves and the availability of
funds to support ethnic television production” (Decision CRTC 2000-772 Ottawa, 21 December 2000).
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With respect to the other major area of discretion, the allocation of subsidies,
multiculturalism has had little impact. The estimated 2002-2003 budgets for key cultural
institutions serving the O cultures are the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
($1,040,200,000), the National Film Board ($61,100,000), the National Gallery of
Canada ($38,455,000), and the National Arts Centre ($24,800,000). These dwarf the
allocation to the multicultural program. On the grant side, the major programmes are the
Canadian Television Fund (CTF) ($241,000,000 allocated in 2000-01), Telefilm’s feature
film fund (FFF) ($96,403,000 allocated in 2000-01), the Canadian Magazine Fund
($45,000,000 estimate 2002-03), and the Book Publishing Industry Development
Program (BMIDP) ($30.7 million allocated in 2000-01).53 With minor exceptions these
funds support projects in the two official and aboriginal languages.54 A preoccupation of
the administrators of these programs is the split between the two official languages and in
the case of CTF and FFF the regional distribution of support within Canada. These
programs provide significant support to commercial firms in the cultural industries. In
contrast, the modest multicultural budget cannot support “profit-making activities for
commercial gain” nor support “the ongoing production of regular newsletters,
newspapers, magazines, journals, and radio and television broadcasts.”
There is little or no use of the vocabulary of multiculturalism in the annual reports of
these funding agencies. A word search for variants of “multicultural” and “diversity” of
the CTF’s and the BPIDP’s annual reports for 2000-2001 turned up the following
incidence: For the CTF, “diversity” occurs once referring to regions55 while “diverse”
occurs twice, once referring to domestic and global markets56 and once to Canada’s
regions and variety of languages57. The words multicultural and multiculturalism do not
                                                
53 We will work with the latest available annual reports of these programs rather than the estimates in order
to use their complementary information. The magazine fund report provides no complementary
information.
54 The CTF, for example, funds only projects in English, French and aboriginal languages. In 2000-01 1%
of the budget was spent on aboriginal language, 34% on French, and 65% on English programs. The
BPIDP reports its statistics in terms of English and French language publishers and titles, e.g., “BPIDP
publishers created 5,708 new titles in 2000-2001: 59% of these were published by French-language
publishers and 41% by English-language publishers” (Book Publishing Industry Activity Report 2000-
2001). An official in Canadian Heritage clarified that there was no formal requirement that publishing
be in official languages and there were some foreign-language publications included in the portfolios
of some publishers (Spanish language was the example given). Telefilm Canada reported in its 2000-
01 Annual Report: “Over the past 15 years, the Feature Film Fund has played a decisive cultural and
industrial role by supporting some 350 feature films, in English and in French, stemming from all
regions of the country and representing a broad panorama of Canadian realities and viewpoints.”
55 “Regional producers provide Canadian audiences with programming that reflects the diversity of
perspectives from across the country. The CTF, recognizing the particular difficulties facing regional
producers in completing production financing, provides incentives to stimulate regional production.”
56 “In an increasingly diverse and competitive global and national market, Telefilm’s cultural mandate is
vitally important. More Canadian stories are being told in both official languages and are more
accessible on the internet, in movie theatres and of course, on television, especially with the rapidly
evolving broadcasting system in Canada.” Canadian Television Fund Annual Report 2000-2001, p. 9.
57 “This focus on regional and linguistic representation from Victoria to St. John’s is vital to capturing and
presenting a true to life vision of this country’s rich and diverse cultural landscape.”
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appear. In the activity report of the BPIDP, “diversity” appears four times. Two of these
occur in phrases not referring to culture--“diversity of titles” (p. 14) and “diversity of
genres” (p. 24). The other two refer to Canadian Heritage’s concern with cultural
diversity.58
During the last decade, opponents of Canadian multicultural policies have been more
vociferous and a public debate has and is occurring.59 The most effective argument of the
opponents of multiculturalism has been that Canadian multiculturalism was the thin edge
of the wedge for strong multiculturalism. In response to this criticism, the government
and defenders of current policy began to put more emphasis on clarifying the limits to
multicultural policy.60 With respect to cultural activities, Kymlicka (1998, 45) reports that
“(s)ome of the most virulent critiques of multiculturalism have been directed at the ethnic
festivals” and “many people seem to equate multiculturalism with such funding, even
though it accounts for only a small fraction of the overall multiculturalism budget.” In
2002, festivals, camps, religious activities, and celebrations of foreign national days are
among the items not eligible for funding in the multicultural program.
In our reading, Canadian multicultural policy has evolved to the limited role of
supporting the integration of immigrant cultures through educational and anti-racist
programs aimed at those communities, members of the O cultures, and those working in
public institutions. Budget allocations to multicultural initiatives are small. In addition,
multiculturalism has had little impact on the generous and Byzantine allocations of rights
and funds that nurture the Canadian cultural industries. In short, Canada’s current
policies, advertised to be at the cutting edge of multicultural initiatives, have hardly
broken the skin of the working constitution. There are no indications that stronger
multicultural policy would be supported politically in Canada nor are the moderate and in
the Canadian context reasonable policies currently in place likely to be rolled back.
We now turn to the task of assessing the degree to which multicultural initiatives are
likely to be effectively included in international agreements.
                                                
58 “A central priority of the Department of Canadian Heritage is to promote an inclusive society and a
shared sense of citizenship that builds on and values Canada’s linguistic duality and cultural diversity.”
and “More specifically, the purpose of the BPIDP is to ensure choice of and access to books written by
Canadian authors, which reflect Canada’s cultural diversity and linguistic duality in Canada and
abroad.” P. 9.
59 Neil Bissoondath, a versatile writer who immigrated to Canada from Trinidad, attacked Canada’s
multicultural policies in his 1994 book Selling Illusions: the Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada as did
Richard Gwyn, a veteran Canadian journalist and author, a year later in Nationalism Without Walls:
The Unbearable Lightness of Being Canadian. Will Kymlicka (1998), a philosopher and political
theorist at Queen’s University, responded to these criticisms (and described the debate) in his 1998
book Finding Our Way, which is based on five papers that he had earlier written for Canadian
Heritage.
60 Kymlicka (1998), for example, devotes a chapter to “The Limits of Tolerance” and gently takes the
government to task for not making these limits clearer to the public.
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International trade negotiations
Of the three major international institutions, the World Bank, the WTO and the IMF, the
WTO is the only one that involves all its members in periodic negotiations. Unlike the
World Bank or the IMF, the WTO does not have discretionary authority to allocate funds
or support to a particular member. It administers and acts as a secretariat for the processes
agreed to by the members. As compared to the constitutions of the IMF and World Bank,
almost all current members of the WTO participated in the negotiation of its constitution,
which bears little resemblance to that governing GATT in 1947. International trade
agreements are also tightly disciplined by the ability to opt out, not just to autarchy, but to
bilateral and regional trade agreements. Regional arrangements have generally
proliferated in the post World War II period61 but rather than threatening the WTO’s
existence they have facilitated negotiation in the WTO, e.g., the resolution of internal
differences within the EC preceded its participation in WTO negotiations, and provided
learning “experiments”62 for extensions of its domain. An exception is the dense web of
coproduction treaties in audiovisual trade that has not provided a stepping stone to a
multilateral system.
As the scope of activities governed by the WTO has widened and member countries have
become more familiar with its bargaining procedures, the gains from negotiation for its
members have increased. There is more potential leeway for adjusting individual offers to
reflect distinctions among countries with respect to their concern over the cultural impact
of imports. The degree of play depends on the bargaining protocol and what aspect of
trade is under consideration. With respect to trade in goods, the GATT adopted linear
tariff cuts in some rounds because of the increasing complexity of tariff schedules and to
make offers easier to compare. Exceptions were allowed and if the original structure of
the tariff reflected cultural values, the linear cuts maintained the relative evaluations. A
more complex protocol was developed in addressing non-tariff barriers. When services
were addressed in the GATS, countries exchanged offers to commit services for national
treatment and market access with respect to four different modes of supply. Qualified
commitments within these categories could also be offered. Tradeoffs were possible
among offers on services and offers of commitments in other areas such as the Agreement
on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and the Agreement on Trade-
related Investment Measures.
Areas of trade that were difficult to fit into the negotiating structure or that could be
better addressed by other means, e.g., agriculture and textiles, were left out of the
process. For these areas a patchwork set of accommodations governed until events or the
negotiating sequence had reached a point where the area could be addressed and either
integrated into the overall system or the patchwork tidied up and recognized as stand-
                                                
61 Preferences based on prior colonial connections such as Commonwealth preferences and French
commercial relations with previous colonies are an exception in that they have receded in importance.
62 Agreements covering a few countries with close affinities permit experiments with deeper integration. If
successful, they provide insights into unanticipated problems, successful mechanisms and the like that
encourage “export” of the ideas to broader configurations among more differentiated members. For a
historical account, see Oye, 1992.
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alone complements. The audiovisual sector, for example, was on the table in the Uruguay
Round but no agreement was reached. Few countries made any commitments to granting
market access and most reserved co-production treaties from the MFN provision in
GATS.
The GATS commits member countries to successive rounds of negotiations to further
liberalize trade in services. The deadline for the first round was the year 2000. By March
2001, the Services Council had established the following negotiating guidelines and
procedures: a member cannot exclude a priori any service sector or mode of supply from
the negotiations; the negotiations shall be transparent and open; and members may
negotiate bilaterally, regionally or multilaterally. Less developed countries may offer to
open fewer sectors, liberalize fewer types of transactions, and phase in market access
concessions. In addition, under Article IV(1)(b) developed countries are obliged inter
alia to improve the access of developing countries to distribution channels and
information networks.63 Negotiations on the audiovisual and other sectors of the cultural
industries would proceed as part of the GATS negotiations in the context of parallel
streams of negotiating in the Doha round. Alternatively, the WTO and its members could
establish a special negotiating protocol for the cultural industries or more narrowly for
the audiovisual sector to govern an additional negotiating stream in the Doha round.
 Table 2: Sample of preamble statements in NICD
Desiring to maintain and strengthen the capacity of all sovereign states to
preserve and enhance cultural diversity, and to ensure their capacity to develop
and implement measures to support diversity of artistic and cultural expression
within and among nations; and taking into account the potential impediments to
these goals that may arise from international trade, investment and services
disciplines
Recognizing the need to increase the exchange of ideas, information and artistic
creations around the world
Acknowledging that support for artistic expression and cultural production can be
an important tool of sustainable economic development
Endorsing the right of artists and creators to freedom of expression and freedom
from censorship
Confirming that there is a special need to preserve the cultures and traditional
knowledge of indigenous peoples
Emphasizing the need to ensure that the implementation and enforcement of
international disciplines concerning trade in goods, investment, services and
intellectual property, not occur in a manner that may undermine, or derogate from
the rights and obligations of Parties to this Convention
                                                
63 Article IV(1) of GATS in full reads as follows: The increasing participation of developing country
Members in world trade shall be facilitated through negotiated specific commitments, by different
Members pursuant to Parts III and IV of this Agreement, relating to: a) the strengthening of their
domestic services capacity and its efficiency and competitiveness, inter alia through access to
technology on a commercial basis; b) the improvement of their access to distribution channels and
information networks;  and c) the availability of services technology.
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How might negotiations proceed under the NICD? After the statement of purposes
discussed in the Introduction of this paper, the preamble to the NICD draft resolution has
15 statements “approved by the membership of the INCD” that begin with desiring (3),
recognizing (6), acknowledging (2) endorsing (1) confirming (2) and emphasizing (1).64
To illustrate that they provide little guidance for structuring a negotiation, we briefly
discuss the first of each type of statement as listed in Table 2.
The endorsing clause does not add to part c) of the NICD’s purposes, mentioned in the
introduction, which states “secure the rights of individual artists and creators to freedom
of expression and to work in security and free from censorship.” The premise in the
desiring clause is that sovereign states with a strong capacity to preserve and enhance
cultural diversity will pursue that goal rather than its opposite. The example of the
destruction of the giant Buddhas of Bamiyan in March 2001 provides a vivid and recent
example of a state destroying rather than fostering. Clearly the Taliban government had
the capacity to preserve but destroyed instead. With respect to the recognizing clause, we
agree that there are benefits from a greater exchange of ideas, information and artistic
creations around the world but disagree that the NICD will promote, rather than curb, this
exchange by leading to a proliferation of restraints on trade, movements of artists, and
financing restrictions. With respect to indigenous peoples, UNESCO already confirms
their special needs to its member states.65
The emphasizing point is the most puzzling. By signing this agreement a country does not
excuse itself from obligations under the WTO. Suppose Canada were a signatory to the
NICD and took a measure against the United States that was judged by a WTO panel to
contravene its obligations. The authors of the NICD draft argue that if the NICD
approves of the action, the United States cannot act under international law. Since the
United States would surely act, either their interpretation of international law is incorrect
or international law has the same status as the Ten Commandments and far less moral
authority. Put in another way, this statement claims that a country signing a trade
agreement is not obliged to obey its restrictions but can enjoy its benefits. Since this is
true for every party, the agreement consists of gratuitous promises. Such commitments
are generally not enforceable under contract law but the courts of some countries will
make exceptions and order performance.66 International agreements are not embedded in
                                                
64 The number of statements beginning with the preceding word is given in parentheses.
65 UNESCO “encourages the: adoption of national cultural policies that enhance indigenous cultural
resources; recognition of indigenous people's cultural rights; protection of indigenous heritage,
especially the intangible heritage; active participation of indigenous communities in the management
of sites, especially World Heritage Sites and sacred sites; implementation of bilingual, intercultural
education programmes; appreciation of the value of the traditional knowledge at the heart of
indigenous lifestyles and, the establishment of links between indigenous and non-indigenous scientific
knowledge with a view to sustainable development; participation of community members in
democratic bodies at local and national levels; development of media and means of communication
suited to the needs of indigenous people.”
66 In Anglo-American law, a contract, for example, is an exchange of promises among individuals or
organizations with legal standing and is normally null and void in the absence of consideration. This
doctrine has been firmly established in Canadian and British law for over two hundred years (see, e.g.,
Fridman, 1994, 81-2). Posner (1977) presents an economic argument of why some gratuitous promises
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the same deep web of law governing contracts.
If a dispute arises among parties and there is no effective enforcement mechanism the
outcome depends on power relations between the two parties. In particular, there is no
international law that spells out when a gratuitous promise can be enforced. A promise by
a wealthy government to give x million in aid to a poor country is in the language of
contract law a gratuitous promise. If the wealthy country fails to transfer the money, the
poor country cannot seek performance or damages in a world court because there is no
international law with the informed “texture” of national law, no court that would hear it,
and no way of enforcing the edict of such a court, if it existed. The Berne Convention
governing copyright, for example, did not have an effective adjudication and punishment
system. This resulted in asymmetric enforcement. Large and powerful countries, such as
the United States, or powerful industry associations, such as the MPA, frequently took
unilateral actions against offending countries—options that were unlikely to be effective
if taken by a small country or its industry associations. Embedding the Berne Convention
in the WTO made its dispute resolution mechanism available to all members large and
small. Asymmetries were reduced.
International agreements have to rely on creating their own internal law and mechanisms
of enforcement. The WTO sets up rules sanctioning measured responses to a member not
complying with its responsibilities so that unstable retaliatory cycles are avoided. How
does the NICD deal with this issue? One prerequisite for the crafting of an enforcement
mechanism is that membership be valuable. The NICD draft convention (Section 4) lists
a set of general commitments that are in line with its anarchic preamble. In general, the
“commitments” are not constraints but licences to do almost anything the member wants
to do. For example, each country can impose whatever import controls, export and
production subsidies, exceptions or special stipulations under competition law, controls
on foreign investment, government purchasing rules, discriminatory arrangements, public
monopolies, tariffs, and policies that serve cultural diversity.67 The Draft Convention
allows the “sovereign authorities” to define terms used in the commitments sections
(Article 2) and make distinctions among cultural goods, products and services that may
compete commercially but are “unalike” in other (presumably diversity) respects.68
Even if the NICD generates a set of mutual constraints that induce more cultural
exchange among its members the gains are unlikely to be large. Many of the countries
that are members of the INCP are net importers of audio-visual content. If all buyers in
say the oil market agree only to trade among themselves, they are unlikely to generate
many benefits. From this perspective as well the NICD is not a credible alternative.
Even if there are significant potential gains, the value of membership depends on
                                                                                                                                                
should be enforced and finds some matching between his conditions and the exceptions to the rule in
American courts.
67 See Articles 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, and 17.
68 See Articles 5 and 14 in particular and interspersed remarks in the other articles discussing
“commitments.”
28
realising them, which in turn requires an effective enforcement mechanism. Perhaps
because the prerequisite is not met, the NICD draft agreement does not attempt to
construct a credible process of matching violations of the agreement with denials of
benefits. Instead it mentions different agencies from which it might borrow enforcement
processes.69 The section of the draft containing that discussion ends with a claim that
there may be no need for an enforcement mechanism as enforcement may somehow flow
from domestic institutions.70
Factoring in the response of the United States weakens the case further. Although the
United States has non-government members in the INCD, it is not a member of the INCP.
The US government is not likely to sign an agreement that grants other countries the right
to discriminate against its exports with impunity. In the case that the NICD became a
reality, the US government would, for example, almost certainly heed the current
campaign by its guilds and professional groups to offset or retaliate against the Canadian
policies that they claim are inducing “runaway” audiovisual productions and retaliate
unilaterally or under NAFTA by withdrawing access to its market in other areas. A
number of significant producers of American style audiovisual product—Australia,
Canada, and the UK—could well increase their exports of audiovisual products to
countries previously supplied by the United States and increase trade among themselves.
Since Canada already has active co-production treaties with France, the UK, and
Australia in audiovisual products the net stimulus would have to come from displacing
US exports in the markets of other INCP countries. This is unlikely to compensate for
reduced access to American markets, as US reaction will be geared to the damages
inflicted upon it and will target activities that cannot be sustained without access to its
market. Publicly traded Canadian film and television production companies report a high
percentage of their revenues from foreign, especially the US market.71 In our opinion, if
the NICD ever came close to becoming a reality, Canadian audio-visual producers are
likely to become vocal, and the Canadian unions sotto voce, opponents of the proposal.
Our examination of the extent that a modern democracy has the will to accommodate
multicultural initiatives reveals that it is small under the most supportive circumstances.
We also speculate from studying the multicultural issue and examining recent
experiences in Canada and Australia that the liberal principle of equality of treatment
becomes more attractive with the complexity and development of a country. This
tendency arises from the difficulty of making complex compacts with different cultures
                                                
69 It muses, for example, that “(p)erhaps the side agreements to NAFTA provide a useful prototype for
resolving such corporate disputes.”
70 “It is not clear from the Lucerne declaration that the INCD has settled on the need for an international
enforcement regime to be established by the Convention itself. For instance, enforcement of the
Convention might be invested entirely in domestic, rather than international institutions.” NICD draft
resolution.
71 Alliance Atlantis, by far Canada’s largest film and television program producer, reports 40% of its
revenues from foreign sources split equally between the US and other countries; Lions Gate
Entertainment Corporation, another publicly traded Canadian audiovisual production and distribution
company, reports that 20% of its revenues came from Canadian sources compared with 63% from the
US and 17% from other foreign sources.
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and altering them in a rapidly changing world. This speculative claim for the
attractiveness of the equal opportunity tenet of liberalism is similar to that made for tit-
for-tat strategies in many contexts (Axelrod, 1984). It is simple, tolerant, and appeals to a
sense of fairness.
In a modern democracy the state can and has opposed with force decisions by a culture
within its borders to opt out of mandated moral or religious measures. If the group resists
a civil war begins. Civil wars fought over morally charged or religious issues are among
the bloodiest conflicts in history. Consider American history:
An estimated 623.000 men died in the Civil War. One out of eleven men of service age
was killed between 1861 and 1865. … . Comparisons with Americans killed in other wars
bring the horror home. In World War I, the number killed was 117,000. In World War II,
405,000 died. In the Korean War, the death toll was 54,000. In the war in Vietnam, the
number of Americans killed was 58,000, Deaths in the Civil War almost equal the
number killed in all subsequent wars. (White, 2002, 111)
Among the reasons that Lincoln fought to prevent the secession of the confederate states
was his government’s opposition to the continuation of slavery. Moral and religious
conflicts play out differently in an international setting because of the absence of the
closer cultural links within a state and the absence of an army controlled by a world
government. It is arguable that South African apartheid raised a similar degree of
indignation among citizens in modern democracies as slavery did among the states within
the United States in 1860. The governments of modern democracies did not respond to
apartheid by declaring war on the South African government that had imposed it. Many
did nothing while others organized trade boycotts against that regime.72 International
governance differs from national governance.
The international institutional structure cannot enforce the same degree of conformity
across countries as can a nation state within its borders. For that reason, international
arrangements permit more diversity than would be the case if the world had a single
government. Some aspects of this diversity—child labour, poverty, environmental
degradation, human rights abuses—are offensive to many citizens of developed
democracies. Other aspects of diversity are generally viewed as adding to the quality of
life. Within an international agreement there may be such value created that it can require
that the generally offensive practices be curbed. The instrument will then encourage less
diversity than in the absence of such conditions for entry. If the agreement offers no gains
to members diversity or any other characteristic of the international economy is
unaffected.
The NICD permits members to restrict the availability of content at will and takes a
cultural laissez-faire approach. The WTO approach in contrast provides a framework in
which a rules-based structure for the movement of artists and performers, access to
cultural services, exchanges of cultural goods and finance can be developed. Like the rule
                                                
72 Boycotts and trade sanctions are controversial instruments in this context as they may further hurt the
group that they are intended to help. As well as their economic effects, they effectively signal a moral
consensus within a number of countries in opposition to the policies of the target country.
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of law within a country, it is an initial step in encouraging additional exchanges among
cultures without a thick history of interactions. Developing the complex environment for
cultural activities that typify modern democracies at an international level is beyond our
reach.
One of the achievements of modern democracies has been to reduce conflicts by creating
a public sphere that allowed cooperation in some dimensions and space to differ on
others, such as religious belief. It is arguable that the dialogical processes and
inclusiveness of democratic politics generates more tolerance for differences within and
among ethnic and religious communities. Although bloody conflicts over moral issues are
more likely within a state, democratic processes provide mechanisms that over a period
of time can reduce the sources of conflict. The development of legal systems and policy
frameworks that have contributed to this end has taken time and experimentation. In the
international sphere effective cooperation among countries has been limited to a few
areas. Experience within international agreements and adjudication bodies can make that
cooperation more effective and promote its expansion but the process of experimentation,
learning and adaptation takes time.
Governments currently face an alternative of being members of a club that offers an
enforceable rules-based environment for trade and investment or a world in which each
country would make its own web of deals. Countries that are not members of the WTO
are not encumbered by its rules and discipline from realizing multicultural and diversity
goals. North Korea, Iraq, and Iran are among the most prominent countries not to belong
to the WTO.73 Their governments have not used their freedom from WTO entanglements
to tolerate, not to say encourage, diversity at home. None of these countries has joined the
INCP, nor are groups or individuals from these countries members of the INCD. Perhaps
they cannot identify any gain from joining a club with no rules as compared to going it
alone.
We were struck by the resemblance between international agreements and the situation of
a country embracing our stylized representation of strong multiculturalism. All cultures in
that state can opt out of any agreement. The state is left as an administrative centre for the
self-enforcing agreements that can be negotiated. The international sphere differs from
that within the strong multicultural state because states and not cultures negotiate the
agreements. Experience has revealed that in this context there are only a few areas in
which a broadly based cooperative process can be maintained. To date trade has been
arguably the most successful of these areas. In our opinion, cultural activities have
generally flourished and their customers and audiences benefited from the flow of ideas,
expressions, and products in a more open world. Wouldn’t it be a shame to jeopardize the
life of this resilient flower because it is not a garden?
                                                
73 Saudi Arabia is not a member but has observer status at the WTO.
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